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Since analytic aesthetics began, around fifty years ago, music has perhaps been the art 
most discussed by philosophers. This interest is reflected even in the contents of this 
volume, with three chapters devoted to specifically musical issues, with other arts getting 
at most one chapter to themselves. The reasons for philosophers’ attraction to music as a 
subject are obscure, but one element is surely that music, as a non-verbal, multiple-
instance, performance art, raises at least as many questions about expression, ontology, 
interpretation, and value as any other art – questions that often seem more puzzling than 
those raised by other arts. 
 Musical ontology – the study of the kinds of musical things there are, and the 
relations that hold between them – has been discussed for as long as any other topic in 
analytic philosophy of music, placed center-stage by Nelson Goodman’s discussion in 
Languages of Art (1968). Amie Thomasson has recently pointed out that the number of 
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proposals offered for the ontology of art in general seems rather an embarrassment of 
riches (2005: 221), and this observation certainly holds for musical ontology in particular. 
The kinds of theories defended about the nature of just Western classical musical works 
include (1) nominalism – a work is a set of scores and/or performances (Goodman 1968, 
Predelli 1995, 1999b), (2) idealism – a work is a particular, or type of, mental entity 
(Collingwood 1938, Sartre 1940), (3) eliminativism – there are no musical works (Rudner 
1950), (4) action theory – a work is a particular, or type of, action performed by the artist 
(Currie 1989, D. Davies 2004), (5) platonism – a work is an eternal abstract object (Kivy 
1983, Dodd 2002), and (6) creationism – a work is a creatable abstract object (Levinson 
1980, Howell 2002).1 
 But the riches are even more embarrassing than this. For in addition to these 
theories about the fundamental metaphysical nature of the classical musical work (what I 
call the ‘fundamentalist debate’ below), there are various competing theories about (i) the 
nature of the relations between works, performances, and recordings, and (ii) theories 
about the similarities and differences between the ontologies of different musical 
traditions, both (a) within the Western classical tradition – Can we generalize about the 
ontology of classical music? (S. Davies 2003) Did the concept of a musical work arise 
relatively recently? (Goehr 1992) – and (b) between the Western classical tradition and 
others, such as Western rock and jazz (Gracyk 1996, Brown 1996), and non-Western 
traditions such as Balinese gamelan (S. Davies 2001). 
                                               
1 The references given here are just illustrative samples. 
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 Finally, there have been a couple of recent defenses of scepticism about musical 
ontology – the view that most of these investigations are fruitless because born of a 
mistaken view of the nature of musical ontology (Ridley 2003, Thomasson 2005). 
 In keeping with the aims of this volume, I will say something about each of the 
three strands in musical ontology delineated above. First I will say something about 
recent work on the fundamental nature of classical works, then I will discuss what I call 
‘higher-level’ musical ontology, including comparative musical ontology and issues like 
the relations between works, performances, and recordings. After each of these 
engagements with the literature, though, I will address some sceptical views of musical 
ontology as it has been practiced heretofore. 
1. The fundamentalist debate 
David Davies has recently presented a thorough defense of an action-theory ontology of 
art in general (2004). Discussion of this theory can be found in Dodd 2005, Kania 2005a, 
and Stock 2005. Also, a recent anomalous but able defender of a Goodmanian 
nominalism is Stefano Predelli (1995, 1999a, 1999b, 2001). Ben Caplan and Carl 
Matheson also seem to be moving in a nominalist direction (2006). Nonetheless, realism 
– the view that musical works are abstract objects – is the most widely accepted view, 
and the debate between platonism – the view that musical works are uncreatable abstracta 
– and creationism – that they are creatable abstracta – is still central in the literature. It is 
thus this debate that I will engage with here. 
One issue that is sometimes addressed within this debate is what kind of 
abstractum a musical work is – type, kind, or universal. However, nothing of 
metaphysical or musical consequence seems to turn on this point (S. Davies 2001: 42, 
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Kania 2005b: 57-9). More important, if works are acknowledged to be types, say, is the 
question of what exactly they are types of. When philosophers originally turned their 
attention to musical ontology in the middle of the twentieth century, though they 
nominally acknowledged the performance aspect of the Western musical tradition, their 
attention was not focused on the nature of performance. As a result, and perhaps for 
understandable reasons of beginning with as simple a model as possible, they tried to 
explain the nature of works and the relation between a work and its performances on the 
model of a simple property and its instances (Goodman 1968, Wollheim 1986, 
Wolterstorff 1980). This quickly led to the problem that either performances must be 
note-perfect in order to be of the works they purport to be of, or all works must be 
identical, since there could be no principled distinction between a perfect performance of 
one work and a hopelessly misguided performance of another (Goodman 1968). 
 In the meantime, however, some theorists turned to a closer examination of the 
nature of musical performance (for example, Levinson 1987, S. Davies 1987, Thom 
1993, and Godlovitch 1998). One of the things that came to light during these discussions 
was that there is an intentional relation between a performance and the composer’s 
specification of the work the performance is of. A performance can only be of a particular 
work if the performers intend to follow the instructions that the composer set down as to 
be followed in performing that work. Spelling out this necessary condition on work 
performance precisely is not a simple task. Mere wishing cannot count as the right kind 
of intention, or else I could perform The Well-Tempered Clavier. Questions of intentional 
content also arise, since I am performing the relevant work when I think I am playing 
Purcell’s Trumpet Voluntary, but am in fact playing a piece by Jeremiah Clarke (because 
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I mean to follow these instructions, which I mistakenly take to have originated in a 
compositional act of Purcell’s).2 But what is important for our purposes here is just that 
some such intention is necessary for a performance to be of a work, that an account of 
such intentions could be given, and that such an account would allow for the possibility 
of someone’s meeting the intentional requirement, yet playing some wrong notes 
(Predelli 1995). For what it means to say that there is such an intentional requirement is 
in part to say that the type or kind of performance a work is is one that is intentionally 
related to the composer’s compositional act. Such a type of performance is still tokened 
when the performers mean to follow all the instructions in the score yet make a few 
mistakes. Thus, I think the problem of imperfect performances is relatively easily solved 
once we have an understanding of the relation between a performance and the work it is 
of.3 This understanding is also helpful in considering the debate between musical 
platonism and creationism. 
 The heart of this debate is whether a respectable conception of musical works as 
creatable abstracta is defensible. This can usefully be viewed in terms of an inconsistent 
triad of propositions: 
 (A) Musical works are created. 
 (B) Musical works are abstract objects. 
 (C) Abstract objects cannot be created. 
Platonists reject (A) on the basis of arguments for (C). Creationists, then, must refute any 
                                               
2 For a detailed discussion of these issues, see S. Davies 2001: 163-6. 
3 There is, of course, a lot more to say about what exactly that relation is. See, for 
example, S. Davies 2001: 151-97. 
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arguments platonists have for (C), and ideally provide an account of how abstract objects 
can be created.4 Part of the debate has been a classic war of intuitions, with platonists 
attempting to soften the appearance of their position by talking up the possibility and 
value of creativity without creation, and our conception of composers as discoverers, 
while creationists emphasize the strength and centrality of the creation intuition to our 
conception of musical works. In my judgment, the outcome of this part of the debate is a 
small victory for the creationists (Kania 2005b: 61-74). The arguments in favor of 
platonism often exhibit ignoratio elenchi – a creationist can accept their conclusions 
without budging from the position that musical works are created. The arguments in favor 
of creationism point out intuitions we could preserve only if platonism were false, but 
those intuitions alone are not strong enough to merit rejection of a substantive argument 
that platonism is the only defensible metaphysical view of musical works as abstract 
objects. This brings us to the substantive metaphysical debate. 
 Platonism has recently found a very able defender in Julian Dodd, and it is his 
arguments for platonism and against creationism that I will now consider.5 While he 
contributes to the debate over the damage done to our creation intuitions by platonism, 
                                               
4 In fact, this triad can be used to frame a debate between platonists, creationists, and 
nominalists. Nominalists, of course, deny (B) and try to explain away our apparent 
references to abstract works as references to concrete objects and events. 
5 As this chapter goes to press, Dodd’s new book on musical ontology (2007) is being 
published. He defends there the same view by means of largely the same arguments as 
those I discuss here. The main difference is in his theory of property existence. This 
affects the argument of a few of the following paragraphs, as I note below. 
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his more important contribution is an extended argument in favor of the view that abstract 
objects cannot be created. He summarizes the argument as follows: 
 (5) The identity of any type K is determined by the condition a token 
meets, or would have to meet, in order to be a token of that type. 
 (6) The condition a token meets, or would have to meet, in order to be 
a token of K is K’s property-associate: being a k. 
So (7) The identity of K is determined by the identity of being a k. 
So (8) K exists if and only if being a k exists. 
 (9) Being a k is an eternal existent. 
So (10) K is an eternal existent too.     (Dodd 2002: 381-2) 
A creationist can in principle attack any one of these premises in order to defuse the 
platonist attack, but the weakest point of the argument is premise (9), and it is on this 
premise and the reasons Dodd gives in its support that I will focus. 
 The main support Dodd gives for (9) is what he calls ‘an intuitive theory 
concerning the existence of properties. The theory in question, simply stated, is that the 
property being a k exists if and only if it is instantiated now, was instantiated in the past, 
or will be instantiated in the future’ (Dodd 2000: 436). As for its intuitiveness, when it 
comes to the metaphysics of properties I doubt we have any pre-theoretical intuitions 
beyond the existence of concrete particulars and their having properties.6 But Dodd also 
                                               
6 Disturbingly, in Dodd’s new book this theory of property existence has been demoted 
from ‘intuitive’ to ‘[a] view that I once seconded,’ ‘an uncomfortable result,’ and ‘hard to 
motivate’ (2007: 62), while an alternative theory is now touted as ‘highly intuitive’ in 
Dodd’s view (2007: 60). The new view is that ‘a property F exists at t if and only if there 
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has some arguments in favor of the view. The first is that it steers us between a Scylla 
and Charybdis of alternative views. The Scylla is 
the doctrine of transcendent properties: the view that the question of whether a 
property exists is utterly independent of the question of whether it is 
instantiated…Charybdis, on the other hand, is the idea that properties exist only 
when instantiated: a view which has properties switching in and out of existence 
as they come to be, and then cease to be, instantiated.     (Dodd 2000: 436) 
But without further argument, Dodd is open to the charge that these theories of the 
existence of properties are not a Scylla and Charybdis, but rather a false dichotomy. He, 
perhaps rightly, sees his theory of property existence as preferable to the two alternatives 
he considers, but he offers no argument for these three theories’ being the only games in 
town. A creationist may, for instance, argue in favor of a view that sees certain properties 
– for instance, those essentially involving contingent beings – as coming into being only 
when the contingent beings they involve come into being.7 This view would not entail 
that the existence of such a property is ‘utterly independent of the question of whether it 
is instantiated’, for it is linked to this question by way of questions about whether it could 
possibly be instantiated. Nor would it entail that ‘properties exist only when instantiated’. 
It suggests there may be different criteria for property existence than simply whether a 
                                                                                                                                            
is some time t* such that t* is either before, after, or identical with t, and at which it is 
(metaphysically) possible for F to be instantiated’ (2007: 61). Though the view he now 
endorses is closer to that for which I argue below, the shifting sands of Dodd’s intuitions 
suggest that we should take their rational force with more than a grain of salt. 
7 Dodd briefly considers this view in his 2007: 63-5. 
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property is, has been, or will be instantiated.8 
 This brief look at the kind of theory the creationist will need to provide in order to 
retain works’ creatability helpfully brings out two aspects of Dodd’s theory of properties. 
One is the principle of instantiation. This is the principle that there are no uninstantiated 
properties, that is, properties that are not instantiated at any point in time. The other is the 
principle of eternality. This is the principle that what properties there are exist eternally; 
properties do not come into or go out of existence. Note that in order to refute Dodd’s 
argument, it would be enough for the creationist to refute the principle of eternality. Let 
us look, then, at Dodd’s arguments for this principle. 
 One argument that often seems implicit runs as follows:9 
(1) Properties are abstract objects. 
(2) Abstract objects do not exist in space or time. 
(3) Causation is spatio-temporal – that is, the relata of the causal relation must 
exist in space and time. 
So (4) No properties are caused to exist. 
This argument engages with some heavyweight issues in metaphysics, particularly the 
nature of abstract objects and the nature of causation. In a recent paper, Ben Caplan and 
Carl Matheson (2004) grapple with some of these issues in relation to Dodd’s views on 
musical works. On the nature of abstract objects, they argue that Dodd’s claims that 
                                               
8 A version of this view – that property existence is tied to the possibility of something’s 
being the correlative way – is defended in Levinson 1978 and 1992, and appealed to by 
Dodd in 2007: 63. 
9 The following formulation of the argument is mine, not Dodd’s. 
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abstract objects are non-spatio-temporal are more or less question-begging, since a 
creationist will not accept such a view of abstract objects. They claim that the platonist 
needs ‘another way of cashing out the distinction between abstract and concrete objects, 
one that is acceptable to [creationists and platonists] alike’ (Caplan and Matheson 2004: 
118). But this seems too much to ask of a philosophical opponent. On any charitable 
interpretation, Dodd does not simply pluck this characterization of abstract objects out of 
the air to suit his current purposes. It is a widely held metaphysical view that many argue 
is well motivated.10 The burden is on the creationist to provide an alternative conception 
of abstract objects if that is what he requires. 
 On the issue of causation, Caplan and Matheson point out that one serious 
contender for a theory of causation posits events as the relata of causal relations, and 
holds events to be sets of a certain kind. But then abstract objects are the relata of the 
causal relation, rendering (3) false. This seems a weak argument. There are other theories 
of causation and events on offer, and Caplan and Matheson do not provide any arguments 
in favor of the views they describe. Now they seem to be in danger themselves of being 
accused of picking their metaphysics to suit their conclusion. As Caplan and Matheson 
are fond of saying, the settling of this issue requires ‘some serious metaphysical work’ 
(2004: 119 and passim). Without that, it is open to a platonist simply to subscribe to 
another respectable theory of causation or events that does not result in abstract objects’ 
being the relata of the causal relation. On the other hand, as I noted above, Dodd’s 
argument for the principle of eternality is implicit, so it is not clear that the burden of 
proof lies at the creationist’s doorstep. I will have something to say about the status of 
                                               
10 See, for example, Lowe 1999: 210-27, and the references given there. 
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these general metaphysical commitments in art-ontological debates near the end of this 
section. 
 A better criticism Caplan and Matheson offer is that Dodd is inconsistent on 
whether he accepts premise (2) (Caplan and Matheson 2004: 122-3). For although he 
insists that all properties are eternal, he grants that some abstract objects, namely, some 
sets, come into and go out of existence, thus existing temporally. For example: 
once the Eiffel Tower was built, the singleton containing the Eiffel Tower thereby 
came into existence, but the fact that such sets can come in and out of existence 
does not violate the principle of the causal inertness of abstracta: the causal 
process in this case involved people and bits of metal, the coming to being of the 
set being an ontological free lunch.     (Dodd 2002: 397) 
Here, Dodd seems to reject (2), that abstract objects do not exist in space or time. Sets 
with temporally initiated concrete objects as members come into and go out of existence, 
and thus exist in time. To hold on to his conclusion (4), then, he must replace the general 
claims in premises (1) and (2) with a more specific claim: 
(11) Properties do not exist in space or time. 
(3) Causation is spatio-temporal – that is, the relata of the causal relation must 
exist in space and time. 
So (4) No properties are caused to exist. 
This replaces the issue of the nature of abstract objects with the issue of the nature of 
properties in particular. 
 Dodd subscribes to David Armstrong’s theory of properties (Dodd 2000: 436, n. 
18). This is an immanent, or ‘Aristotelian’, view of universals. It combines the principle 
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of instantiation, mentioned above, with naturalism, a view that entails that universals 
exist only in their instances, that is, within the spatio-temporal realm.11 This is opposed to 
a transcendent, or ‘Platonic’ view of universals, whereby they exist outside of space and 
time, and not in their spatio-temporal instances (Armstrong 1989).12 One consequence of 
such a view, which Dodd does not acknowledge, is that in the absence of further 
argument, immanent universals would seem to exist very much in space and time. It 
seems quite natural, if universals exist only in their instances, to say that they begin to 
exist when they begin to be instantiated, and cease to exist when they cease to be 
instantiated. If Dodd wants to resist this conclusion (which appears to commit him to the 
Charybdis of intermittent properties discussed above), he must explain how universals’ 
existence when they are not instantiated in space and time is consistent with his 
naturalism. He may claim that the eternal existence of properties, like the existence of 
sets, is an ‘ontological free lunch’. But this is not a very satisfying response, since it is of 
a kind usually available to one’s opponents in some form in any metaphysical debate 
where its use is tempting (Thomasson 2001). 
 If properties can have temporal beginnings, as suggested above, then the 
                                               
11 Thus, Dodd rejects this view in his 2007, along with the principle of instantiation, 
partly for the reasons I give here. His current view, however, while closer to that I defend 
below, still endorses the principle of eternality. Unfortunately, my arguments against his 
current view must wait for another time. 
12 A neglected third option is that some universals may exist in time, but not in space (the 
question of their spatial location being a kind of category error). Such universals would 
not exist in their spatio-temporal instances. I discuss this option further below. 
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creationist has made some headway. If there is a type for every property, and vice versa, 
and properties have temporal beginnings, then we are part of the way to an explanation of 
how types can be created. But Dodd might grant the temporal initiation of properties, and 
hence types, and yet resist their creatability, again on the basis of the nature of causation 
and abstract objects. For even if some abstract objects are brought into being by spatio-
temporal events, as he admits the singleton containing the Eiffel Tower is, and as the 
above considerations suggest some properties are, Dodd might argue that this ‘being 
brought into being’ is not creation. That is, Dodd could retreat to the position that musical 
works are temporally initiated, but that it does not follow that they are caused or, a 
fortiori, created. 
 Caplan and Matheson offer three ways to respond to this suggestion. The first is 
that the suggestion is inconsistent with the principle that things that come into existence 
must be caused to exist. Such a response seems to be an appeal to a version of the 
principle of sufficient reason. It is thus a weak response, since there are no compelling 
reasons either a priori or a posteriori to subscribe to this principle (Mackie 1982: 82-7). 
The second response is that on a counterfactual analysis of causation, the coming into 
being of an abstract object in the way described just is an instance of causation. Had 
people not acted in such a way as to construct the Eiffel Tower, the singleton containing 
it would not have come into existence. Therefore, the people who caused the Eiffel 
Tower to come into existence also caused the singleton containing it to come into 
existence. This is a weak response for the same reason that Caplan and Matheson’s 
appeal to the event-based theory of causation is weak. It is open to Dodd simply to appeal 
to some other theory of causation. 
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 But Caplan and Matheson’s third response is stronger, for it allows granting the 
retreating Dodd his claim that temporal initiation does not imply causation. The response 
is that even if we grant that the people who built the Eiffel Tower did not strictly cause its 
singleton to exist, the singleton still came into existence as a result of their actions; even 
if we grant that Beethoven did not strictly cause his Fifth Symphony to exist, it still 
would not have existed had he not engaged in his compositional activity. Thus this third 
response is a version of the second, without the counterfactual theory of causation. 
[R]ecall that the creatability requirement is supposed to be motivated by untutored 
intuitions. Insofar as there is a distinction to be made between causing something 
to come into existence (in the strict and philosophical sense) and bringing it into 
existence (in the loose and popular sense), people do not have intuitions about 
what can, or cannot, be caused to come into existence; rather, they have intuitions 
about what can, or cannot, be brought into existence.     (Caplan and Matheson 
2004: 123) 
 If the argument thus far has been sound, then we have seen that properties, and 
hence types, are creatable in a sense that respects the creation intuition. But that is not 
enough to show that musical works are created by their composers during the act of 
composition. For a musical work, if a type, is a type of performance. The complex 
property that is the property-associate of the type is a property that performances 
instantiate, or possess. But if, as Dodd’s principle of instantiation implies, properties 
come into existence when they are first instantiated, then a musical work only comes into 
existence when it is first performed. And this would make the first performers of a work 
its creators, rather than the composer. Moreover, my remarks above suggest that 
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properties come into and go out of existence as they are instantiated. This would have the 
further odd consequences (i) that a musical work does not persist through time, but pops 
into and out of existence, according to whether and when it is being performed, and (ii) 
that it is brought back into existence at each performance by whoever is performing it. 
All of these consequences seem to violate corollaries of the creation intuition. 
 There is a further odd consequence of Dodd’s adherence to the principle of 
instantiation, one which can be turned into a reductio of his position. By subscribing to 
the principle of instantiation, he denies the existence of uninstantiated properties.13 But if 
musical works are types of performance, then works that go unperformed do not have 
their property-associate instantiated. It follows that neither the property nor its type-
associate, the work, exist. But that means that the composer of the work could not have 
discovered it, composition being discovery for a platonist. Thus, on Dodd’s view, any 
work that has not, is not, and will not receive a performance has not in fact been 
composed. 
 But I am not committed to the principle of instantiation. I will now sketch an 
alternative metaphysical picture to the one Dodd provides. Its first element is the 
neglected third option for the mode of existence of abstracta, noted above. We are not 
compelled to choose between abstracta that exist outside of space and time, and those that 
exist in their instances – firmly within space and time. Another option is that (some) 
abstracta exist in time, but not in space. This option is often ignored in surveys of the 
possible meaning of ‘abstract’ (for example, Lowe 1999: 210-16), but not always (for 
example, Rosen 2001). It is not obvious why temporal, but non-spatial, existence should 
                                               
13 Again, in his 2007, Dodd rejects this principle, partly for the reasons I give here. 
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be considered more problematic than non-spatiotemporal existence.14 Investigating this 
option might be seen as part of a program Amie Thomasson suggests of broadening the 
class of entities metaphysicians take interest in: 
In short, if, rather than trying to make works of art fit into the off-the-rack 
categories of familiar metaphysical systems, one attempts to determine the 
categories that would really be suitable for works of art as we know them through 
our ordinary beliefs and practices, the payoff may lie not just in a better ontology 
of art, but in a better metaphysics.     (Thomasson 2004: 90) 
Subscribing to this view of the mode of existence of musical works (or other abstracta) 
immediately puts paid to the problems of intermittent existence. For, on this view, the 
work does not exist in its instances, thus there is no need for it to go out of existence 
when there are no instances of it around. Its existence in time, on the other hand, allows it 
to begin to be at a certain point – a key requirement for creatability. 
 The second element of the view is a principle of possible instantiation, intended 
as an alternative to Dodd’s principle of instantiation. According to this new principle, a 
                                               
14 Compare spatial, but non-temporal, existence, which is hard to make sense of. 
I should also note here that my talk of ‘modes of existence’ is metaphorical. I take 
existence to be univocal. As Lowe puts it, ‘[t]o exist in space and time is not to have a 
special kind of existence – for the notion of existence, like that of identity, is univocal. 
Rather, it is just to have certain sorts of properties and relations – spatiotemporal ones’ 
(Lowe 1999: 212). The ‘mode of existence’ I am suggesting we consider is just 
something’s having temporal, but no spatial, properties. 
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property exists at any time that it could be instantiated.15 If, as I suggested earlier, the 
type of performance a work is includes an intentional link to the compositional act of its 
composer, then such a performance becomes possible with that act of composition. So the 
other aforementioned problems with Dodd’s account do not apply to my suggestion – 
works come into existence with their composition, not performance, and unperformed 
works are easily individuated. 
 I should say a little about the kind of possibility my principle invokes. There is a 
sense in which it is possible for there to be a performance of Beethoven’s Ninth 
Symphony right now. Perhaps no one has in fact done the requisite organizing, 
rehearsing, and so on, but someone could have. In this same sense of ‘possible’, it is not 
possible for there to be a performance of Beethoven’s Tenth Symphony right now. No 
amount of organization or rehearsal will be sufficient, because there is nothing to 
rehearse, nothing to organize a performance of. Why? Because, of course, Beethoven did 
not compose a tenth symphony. The reason this sense of possibility needs to be 
distinguished from others is that Beethoven might have composed a tenth symphony, had 
he lived longer, or had different priorities. And since he might have composed such a 
work, it might have been performed. (There are possible worlds where Beethoven 
composed a Tenth Symphony and then attended its première.) Thus, it is the sense of 
                                               
15 Dodd’s latest principle of instantiation, noted above, differs from mine in that he takes 
a property to exist at a given time iff there is some time at which it could be instantiated. 
This is what allows him to hold on to the principle of eternality. The implausibility of this 
view is suggested by the discussion which follows, but its full elaboration must come 
elsewhere. 
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‘possible’ in which it is possible to perform Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, but is not 
possible to perform Beethoven’s Tenth, that is appealed to in my principle of possible 
instantiation.16 
 I have articulated an alternative picture to Dodd’s, but I have not argued for it. At 
best I have shown that it is a coherent alternative. Why, then, should anyone subscribe to 
my view rather than Dodd’s? Precisely because my view respects the creation intuition. 
Dodd might respond that an intuition only counts as a reason to subscribe to a theory 
prima facie, or ceteris paribus. He would claim that neither of these conditions is met by 
the creation intuition. Nobody aware of the debate can claim that we are still evaluating 
the creatability of musical works at first glance, and Dodd would say that, given his 
arguments, things other than the creation intuition are no longer equal. We cannot hold on 
to our creation intuition in the face of his arguments about the uncreatability of abstracta. 
 My response to this begins with recalling my earlier arguments that Dodd’s case 
depends on controversial general, or fundamental, metaphysical theses – what might be 
called ‘technical’ points. There are two ways to avoid relying in a question-begging way 
                                               
16 This sense of possibility is closely related to the sense in which Saul Kripke suggests 
there could be no unicorns: ‘no counterfactual situation is properly describable as one in 
which there would have been unicorns’ (Kripke 1980: 156). No counterfactual situation 
is properly describable as one in which Beethoven’s Tenth Symphony is being 
performed. This sense of possibility might also be seen as related to Armstrong’s ‘inner 
sphere’ of possibility (1997: 165-9), though that notion is much more technical, and thus 
less ready to hand for my purposes here. But see also David Lewis’s discussion of ‘alien 
possibilities’ (1986: passim). 
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on such theses. One is to wait for the more fundamental metaphysical disputes to be 
solved. Another is to solve them yourself. Taking the former path involves giving up 
musical ontology for the time being (and, if the history of metaphysics is anything to go 
by, for the foreseeable future). The latter path gives you something to do with the time 
you used to devote to musical ontology, but doesn’t seem likely to bring the dispute to a 
close any earlier. 
 In light of the fact that disputes such as those between Dodd and his critics17 are 
unlikely to be resolved anytime soon, given that their resolution depends on the 
resolution of more fundamental metaphysical disputes, we are back to the point where 
things other than the creation intuition are equal. Thus the intuition has force once more – 
not prima facie force but, perhaps even better, force after reflection. 
 2. Some scepticism about musical ontology 
You might wonder whether the kind of debate engaged in above ought really to be 
classified as musical ontology – whether its proper place is really in a volume of 
aesthetics rather than a volume of metaphysics.18 For the issues being discussed seem to 
be those that are discussed in general metaphysics, which can give the impression that 
this is no more musical ontology than a metaphysical consideration of artifacts that takes 
musical instruments as its central example. One defense that might be given is that 
                                               
17 For example, Caplan and Matheson, as discussed above, Howell (2002), who defends 
creationism differently from Caplan and Matheson, but by similar reliance on 
controversial metaphysical theses, and Trivedi 2002. 
18 Aaron Ridley wonders this, though for different reasons. I consider his concerns in 
section 4. 
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artworks, particularly musical works, are among the most metaphysically puzzling things 
there are, and thus that they are not mere examples, but centrally important ones for any 
general metaphysician.19 Anyway, even if this criticism is a good one, it does not object 
to this kind of metaphysics’ being done, only to its classification as part of the philosophy 
of music proper. 
 Amie Thomasson (2005) has recently defended a limited scepticism about the 
ontology of art in general, which might be applied to the fundamentalist debate. She 
argues that in order to ground and reground the reference of an art-kind term, such as 
‘string quartet’, users of the term must have a background ontological sortal in mind, 
about which they cannot be mistaken (Thomasson 2005: 222-3). For instance, when 
Shmarb proclaims ‘This is my sixth string quartet’, pointing to the pile of inked-up 
manuscript on his desk, if his baptism is to succeed he must be thinking of a whole 
multiply-instantiable sonic item, as opposed to a concrete particular (to which he is also 
ostensibly pointing), a spatial or temporal part of that concrete particular, the 
countersubject of the fugue in the fourth movement, and so on. Of course, he does this 
disambiguation in part by using the term ‘string quartet’, thus appealing to an established 
art-kind term. The grounders and re-grounders of this kind-term, like the (re-)grounders 
of any kind-term, face the same problem of disambiguation as Shmarb – the ‘qua 
problem’. In order for their (re-)grounding to be successful, they must have a more 
fundamental ontological sortal in mind which determines the identity and persistence 
                                               
19 This kind of defense of the ontology of art is made by Amie Thomasson (2004, 2005), 
though she might not endorse it in defense of the kind of debate engaged in in section 1, 
as we shall soon see. 
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conditions of members of the kind. As a result, and this is where Thomasson’s scepticism 
arises, there are only as many facts about the identity and persistence conditions of string 
quartets as can be derived from the sortal the (re-)grounders of the term have in mind. In 
other words, there may be questions about musical works which simply have no answer, 
since our conception of them is vague and incomplete (Thomasson 2005: 227-8). 
 The creatability of multiple artworks is not one of the questions to which there is 
no determinate answer, according to Thomasson (2005: 226-7). That is one of the basic 
ontological components dictated by the sortal, about which we cannot be wrong. Yet, at 
the same time, she recognizes the importance of what David Davies calls ‘the pragmatic 
constraint’ on any ontology of art: ‘Artworks must be conceived ontologically in such a 
way as to accord with those features of our critical and appreciative practice upheld on 
rational reflection’ (D. Davies 2004: 23). That is, the only way to discover our shared 
conception of an art-kind is by extracting its features from our shared artistic practice. 
 The problem, though, is that our artistic practices often seem to point not just to 
vague or incomplete conceptions of artworks, but downright contradictory ones, and the 
revisionary ontological views that Thomasson is at pains to rule out – such as Davies’s, 
that works are in fact the creative performances of their composers – are attempts to 
make the best sense of these contradictory practices. Dodd sees his view that musical 
works cannot be created as motivated in the same way: ‘I agree with Davies that there is 
no conception of artworks that manages to pass muster metaphysically without 
compromising some of our pre-theoretical intuitions; our disagreement concerns whether 
the performance theory does this better than the structuralism he rejects…’ (2005: 86-7). 
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 Thomasson might respond by pointing out that it is basic ontological conceptions 
that take priority here, since it is those that disambiguate and ground the reference of the 
term being used. Thus, other conceptions, such as the kind of property that might be 
attributed to a string quartet, should not be taken into account at this stage, as they are by 
Davies.20 Dodd’s arguments, though, are not of this kind. His strategy, rather, is to argue 
that there cannot be any such things as are described by our ontological conception of 
musical works. If he is right about this, it seems that Thomasson would have to conclude 
that ‘string quartet’ does not refer – that is, there are no quartets, or any musical works 
for that matter. For she is careful to note throughout her argument that though one cannot 
be wrong about the basic ontological category of the referent of the term one is 
grounding, one might be wrong about there being any such referent (as when one points 
to a feather duster and says ‘that kind of animal’): ‘All grounders are assured of…is that, 
if there is any art-kind referred to by the terms they attempt to ground the reference of, it 
has the ontological standing they commonly (if tacitly) understand and treat it as having’ 
(Thomasson 2005: 227, first emphasis added). 
 Nonetheless, given her distaste for radically revisionary ontologies of art, I 
presume that Thomasson would resist the conclusion that there are no musical works. If it 
comes to this, Thomasson can, at the very least, put the burden back on the revisionist’s 
shoulders. For he is beholden to show that his proposed revision is as little revisionary as 
                                               
20 Of course, the question of what kind of properties a given kind of thing might possess 
is an ontological one. But perhaps an argument can be made that it is a less basic 
ontological part of our conception of a work, and thus trumped by more basic parts of 
that conception, such as creatability. 
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possible (Thomasson 2006: 251-3). In Dodd’s case this would mean showing that his 
theory of what a musical work is is the closest coherent competitor to our pre-theoretical 
conception of a musical work. Another option would be to reject Dodd’s metaphysically 
fundamentalist style of argument as inappropriate to cultural entities such as musical 
works. This would require a theory of the nature of cultural entities, and seems to be the 
direction in which Thomasson is headed. A further alternative would be to revive 
idealism, which has found few adherents in the analytic tradition. Georges Rey has 
recently defended a view of linguistic entities, such as sentences, words, morphemes, and 
phonemes, as ‘intentional inexistents’: ‘They “are there” only for us in our 
communicative and mnemonic practices. If those practices can be explained without 
them, there is no independent reason to believe in them’ (Rey 2004). The details of these 
views, and the extent of their similarity, I leave as avenues for future research.21 
 Where does all this leave my contribution to the fundamentalist debate – the 
suggestion that works exist (i) temporally but not spatially, and (ii) when it is possible to 
instance them? I suspect Dodd and others involved in the debate will be unhappy with the 
lack of metaphysical rigor about my suggestion. Thomasson might like the basic thesis – 
that it’s not possible to perform a piece before it has been composed – but is likely to 
think that the justification for such a claim is our artistic practice, rather than any 
highfalutin metaphysical argument. I leave it to the reader to decide in exactly which 
ways the contribution is inadequate. 
                                               
21 The similarity between Thomasson’s view and Rey’s idealism is intriguing, since 
Thomasson has developed a substantial theory of fictional entities that harks back to 
Roman Ingarden’s idealism (Thomasson 1999, Ingarden 1973). 
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 3. Higher-level musical ontology 
There has recently been growing interest among analytic philosophers of music in 
traditions other than Western classical music. The issues discussed in the literature on the 
ontology of other traditions, particularly rock and jazz, are quite different from those 
central to the fundamentalist debate. The fact that there are creatable, multiply 
instantiable pieces and recordings, and particular performance and playback events that 
instantiate them, is taken more or less for granted. The focus of these debates is rather on 
the relationships between these things, and the roles they play in musical practices. For 
instance, Theodore Gracyk (1996: 1-36) has argued that recordings are at the center of 
rock as an artform, and thus that they deserve the honorific ‘work of art’, while the songs 
they manifest, and live performances of those songs, are secondary. Stephen Davies 
disagrees, arguing that rock songs, like classical pieces, are works of art, and that they are 
merely created for a different kind of performance – studio performance (2001: 30-36). 
 There is, rightly, no reference to fundamental ontological issues in this debate. 
This is because these issues lie at a higher (that is, less fundamental) metaphysical level 
than the debate over the creatability of musical works. For instance, the thesis that rock 
works are recordings for playback, rather than works for performance, is neutral with 
respect to more fundamental metaphysical theories about the nature of the type-token 
relation. If the nominalists turn out to be right, then talk of types is simply a convenient 
way of talking about tokens. If the realists turn out to be right, type-talk is about quite 
different things from tokens. But which of them is right will not bear on the fact that rock 
works are a different kind of type from classical works – one for playback rather than 
performance. 
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 The independence of ontological theories at these different levels should come as 
no more of a surprise than the independence of scientific theories from fundamental 
ontological theories, or for that matter the independence of music analysis from musical 
ontology. The true fundamental ontological theory had better make room somewhere for 
our talk about planets, and indeed most fundamental ontological theories are neutral with 
respect to the existence of planets.22 Theories of musical ontology had all better make 
room for melodies, and the most fundamental of them had better make room for works 
for performance. As with the first sceptical argument considered above, this is not an 
argument against engaging in the more fundamental debate, but it does seem clear that 
these higher-level ontological issues are more closely tied to other issues in musical 
aesthetics, such as those of interpretation and value, than the fundamental metaphysical 
issues. 
 Higher-level ontology need not be comparative, however. The debate over the 
necessary and sufficient conditions on a performance’s being of a particular (classical) 
work are similarly neutral with respect to the fundamental metaphysical nature of 
performances and works. Another issue in this same boat is that of the nature of elements 
of musical works, such as melodies, harmony, rhythm, and so on, so far addressed in 
detail only by Roger Scruton (1997: 19-79) and Stephen Davies (2001: 47-71). The 
beginnings of a different kind of musical analysis for playback works, such as electronic 
classical music and rock, raises questions about the nature of additional musical elements, 
such as the aural space of a recording and timbre, and how they can contribute to a 
                                               
22 Despite what some of their adherents say. See Silberstein 2002 and Thomasson 2001. 
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musical whole.23 
 One meta-ontological conclusion that I draw from this range of topics in musical 
ontology is that there is no sharp line between philosophical ontology and musicology 
(broadly construed). Just as there is little sense in distinguishing the more abstract 
scientific writing about Quantum Theory from the applied philosophy of science on that 
topic, musical ontology at higher levels shades into musicology.24 On the other hand, 
though we are unlikely to confuse musicology and particle physics, as we descend to the 
fundamental ontological levels, despite our talking about quark flavors in one case and 
sound structures in the other, the issues can be the very same. 
4. Some more scepticism about musical ontology 
Aaron Ridley has recently argued that musical ontology is a waste of time (2003). The 
debate he discusses as a representative example of what he is arguing against is that over 
the necessary and sufficient conditions on a performance’s being of a particular work, a 
debate I classify as higher-level. Ridley’s attack has three parts. He argues that (i) there 
are no puzzling questions in musical ontology and, even if there were, nothing would be 
gained by considering them, since (ii) musical ontology has no consequences for musical 
practice or value, because despite what musical ontologists claim (iii) the ontological 
facts about music depend on facts about its value. 
                                               
23 For examples of criticism and theory of this sort about rock music, see Daley 1998 and 
Zak 2001: 48-96. 
24 Note that this is consistent with my view stated earlier that conclusions at one level are 
independent of those at another. 
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 There is no space to go into the details of Ridley’s arguments here.25 Instead I will 
see if anything might be salvaged from Ridley’s conclusions. That is, I will discuss some 
more plausible theses that might be considered in the same ballpark as Ridley’s 
hyperbolic claims. His first claim is beyond redemption. Perhaps all those who have 
engaged in musical ontology have been logic-chopping simpletons, but it seems unlikely. 
Furthermore, Ridley strangely avoids simply stating the unpuzzling facts of musical 
ontology, and in fact, despite his claims to the contrary, commits himself implicitly to a 
range of questionable ontological assumptions. 
 Ridley’s second claim is also unsupportable, at least as a general claim. One 
cannot evaluate something without evaluating it as a particular kind of thing, and thus to 
evaluate it correctly, one must evaluate it as the kind of thing it actually is (S. Davies 
2001: 203-5). Musical ontology is the study of the kinds of musical things there are, and 
thus it is an essential part of a complete theory of musical value.26 
 As we have seen, however, there are a number of different issues under the 
umbrella of musical ontology. And it may be that some of these are more relevant to 
questions of musical value than others. To give a non-musical example: to evaluate my 
                                               
25 For that, see Kania (unpublished). 
26 There is of course a huge literature on this topic, notwithstanding Ridley’s puzzlement: 
‘“How, exactly, is a convincing ontological backdrop supposed to lend perspicuity to 
evaluative questions? No one, so far as I am aware, has actually asked this: certainly no 
one has given any sort of explicit answer” (Ridley 2003: 210). For a couple of canonical 
examples, see Walton 1970 and Danto 1981. Walton discusses a specifically musical 
example in his 1988. 
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new piece of designer furniture correctly, you must realize it is a coffee table rather than 
a chaise-longue. But I don’t think you need trouble yourself about whether it is a 
substance instantiating various universals or a bundle of tropes. Either way, it looks just 
as good in the living room. Similarly, Ridley’s conclusion may apply to questions about 
the fundamental nature of musical works (which he barely notes), though it does not 
apply to the question he focuses on – the nature of the work–performance relation – or 
other higher-level ontological questions.27 
 Could Ridley be wrong about the independence of value facts from ontological 
facts, but be right about the dependence of ontological facts on value facts? That is, could 
value facts and ontological facts be inter-dependent? In a sense, I think, the answer is yes. 
Perhaps the most widespread consensus amongst philosophers of art is that we are in the 
business of making sense of a very complicated, even messy, human cultural practice. 
Now, if there is some objective universality to this practice, as some argue on 
evolutionary psychological grounds,28 we might be able to make some general claims 
about artistic practices that do not even exist yet, just as linguists can describe some 
features of any natural human language that has not yet been encountered.29 But there are 
other questions that cannot be answered without investigating the practice in question, 
                                               
27 Jerrold Levinson has argued that if musical works are not the creations of their 
composers they are less valuable than we had thought (1990: 218). If this is correct, even 
fundamental ontological issues have far-reaching consequences for musical value. 
28 See, for example, de Sousa 2004 and Currie 2004. 
29 Of course, they could not have the theory that enables these descriptions without 
having first investigated a range of natural human languages. 
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and the higher-level questions of musical ontology are of this kind. Higher-level musical 
ontology, then, describes certain features of a pre-existing practice, one which has 
developed as a whole, with ontological, evaluative, interpretive, institutional, and all sorts 
of other features interacting with each other. Thus, in some sense, the ontology of a 
specific tradition might be the result to some extent of the evaluative practice in that 
tradition (and vice versa). But this is a long way from Ridley’s implausible idea that 
confronted with a musical performance, first we settle the evaluative questions, and then 
go on to answer the ontological ones on that basis. 
5. Conclusions 
None of the sceptical arguments we have looked at has provided a compelling reason to 
abandon musical ontology. However, the most promising avenues of research seem to lie 
outside the fundamentalist debate. First, there is the question of how cultural entities, 
such as musical works, are different from other kinds of objects, such as so-called natural 
kinds. Second, there are the higher-order musical-ontological issues, such as the different 
ontologies of various kinds of music, the nature of the elements of various kinds of 
musical works, and the nature of the relations between different kinds of entities within 
these various traditions. If anything these ontological questions seem to imply that there 
is even more to be discussed in the philosophy of music than has been considered so 
far.30 
                                               
30 I am grateful to Amie Thomasson and the editors for helpful comments on a draft of 
this chapter, and to Trinity University for financial support during the writing of this 
chapter. 
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